Yet although Al Qaeda has repeatedly called for attacks against Westerners, and especially Americans, it has refrained from killing Westerners when it suited its purposes. Al Qaeda often takes a similar approach to Western aid workers operating in its midst: on at least two occasions, senior leaders of the Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra implored the Islamic State to release Western aid workers the Islamic State had captured and were threatening to execute.
The Islamic State evolved out of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, and its tactics reflect this context. Terrorism, in this context, is part of revolutionary war: it is used to undermine morale in the army and police, force a sectarian backlash, or otherwise create dynamics that help conquest on the ground. But it is an adjunct to a more conventional struggle. Al Qaeda, in contrast, favors a more gentle approach. A decade ago Zawahiri chastised the Iraqi jihadists for their brutality, correctly believing this would turn the population against them and alienate the broader Muslim community, and he has raised this issue in the current conflict as well.
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State both profess to lead the jihadist cause throughout the Muslim world. The Islamic State is playing this game too, and wherever there is a call to jihad, there is a rivalry. Although attention is focused on the Islamic State, Al Qaeda affiliates have done well in recent months.
The Islamic State has gained support from a number of important jihadist groups. In March, Islamic State supporters in Yemen bombed Houthi mosques, playing on the sectarian war narrative that the Islamic State has long emphasized and Al Qaeda has long sought to suppress—indeed, AQAP immediately issued a statement publicly disavowing any involvement in the mosque bombings. It is difficult, however, to gauge the overall level of Islamic State support.
Al Qaeda has historically been fairly quiet for a terrorist group when it comes to claiming and boasting of attacks, while the Islamic State often exaggerates its own prowess and role to the point of absurdity.
In the past, when an affiliate joined Al Qaeda, it usually took on more regional activities and went after more international targets in its region, but did not focus on attacks in the West.
By taking on the Islamic State label, local groups seem to want to attach themselves to a brand that has caught the attention of jihadists worldwide. Yet this ascendance may be transitory. Like its predecessor organization in Iraq, the Islamic State may also find that its brutality repels more than it attracts, diminishing its luster among potential supporters and making it vulnerable when the people suddenly turn against it. The good news is that the Islamic State is not targeting the American homeland—at least for now.
Its emphasis is on consolidating and expanding its state, and even the many foreign fighters who have flocked to its banner are being used in suicide bombings or other attacks on its immediate enemies, not on plots back in the West. Western security services are on high alert against the Islamic State threat. The thousands of foreign fighters under its banner are post a risk of greater regional instability at the very least, and U. Many of these individuals will have had little or no contact with the Islamic State as an organization, but they find its ideology and methods appealing and will act on their own.
Ironically, some of these individuals may have preferred to go to Iraq and Syria, but Western disruption efforts make it easier for them to attack at home. The United States and its allies should try to exploit the fight between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda and, ideally, diminish them both.
Efforts to stop foreign fighters should stress this infighting. Playing up its atrocities, especially against other Sunni Muslims, will steadily discredit the group. Military efforts matter tremendously beyond the immediate theater of operations. For Al Qaeda, the constant drone campaign has diminished the core in Pakistan and made it harder for it to exercise control over the broader movement. Zawahiri himself is an important target, as he is the last major figure of the original generation of Al Qaeda with a global profile, and he will not be easily replaced.
For the Islamic State, defeat on the ground will do more to diminish its appeal than any propaganda measure. If it fails at this mission by losing territory, its luster will diminish. The threat to U. Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and local jihadist groups have long put them in their crosshairs, and the Islamic State is likely to do the same. The overall level of risk remains roughly similar, but their manner of death if captured is likely to be more gruesome at the hands of the Islamic State. Because of the appeal and strength of both Al Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State, programs to gather intelligence and develop the strength of local regimes and at times substate groups when the regime is weak or hostile as in the case of Syria are vital.
Both refer to Iraq as an opportunity for the global jihadist movement to take advantage of insecurity in the heart of the Arab world and to spread into neighboring areas.
The Three Foundations. Al Qaeda's strategic analysis and the operations of its affiliates continue to be supported by centrally planned ideological outreach activities. In a January 30, audiotape, for example, Ayman Al Zawahiri identified "three foundations" of Al Qaeda's political ideology and applied them to events in Iraq and elsewhere.
Al Zawahiri, who is regarded as Al Qaeda's chief ideologue, described Al Qaeda's core principles in sharp contrast to secular and. The Iraqi who joins this renegade government to fight against the Mujahidin, who resists occupation, is considered a renegade and one of the infidels, even if he were an Arab from Rabi'ah or Mudar tribes. The most pressing duty after faith is repelling the aggressor enemy. This means that the nation should devote its resources, sons, and money to fight the infidels and drive them out of its lands.
See also the Quran - Al Tawbah, This may signal an attempt by Al Qaeda's leadership to renew and clearly define its goals as a basis for attracting new recruits and inspiring new affiliates.
The "three foundations," as outlined by Al Zawahiri are as follows:. Al Qaeda on Democracy and Reform. Osama Bin Laden and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi have applied these and other similar principles to current issues of democracy, reform, and conflict in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
In both of his December statements, for example, Bin Laden clearly stated his view that democracies, constitutional governments, and insufficiently Islamic monarchies are equally unacceptable forms of governance for Islamic societies because they empower human rulers and man-made legal systems rather than "the law of God. According to Bin Laden, Muslims have a right to participate in the selection of their rulers only under certain "conditions," namely the absence of occupying foreign powers and the presence of candidates willing to rule solely according to Islamic law.
Bin Laden's December statements urged Muslims to oppose the creation of democratic governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories; to resist non-Islamic reform movements in other Islamic societies; and to overturn existing regimes deemed insufficiently-Islamic by Al Qaeda such as the Saudi monarchy. Both speakers based their calls for revolutionary change in Islamic societies on a stated belief in a model of governance where Muslims are empowered to choose and depose their leaders according to Islamic principles.
A Strategic Framework. Al Qaeda military commander Sayf Al Adl concluded his May text with advice for Abu Musab Al Zarqawi and other affiliates that includes a detailed strategic framework for the jihadist movement. A summary of Al Adl's framework follows:. Recent statements from Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, and Sayf Al Adl display the uncompromising commitment of Al Qaeda's leaders and affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda focused on two goals: the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and, ultimately, the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.
The political prescriptions outlined in the statements are rooted in the Islamic principle known as tawhid, or the principle of the absolute unity of God, and an identification of Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social system.
Throughout their recent statements, Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi characterized as "infidels" those who do not share these beliefs, those who oppose the creation of an Islamic state on the terms they describe, and those supporting existing governments and coalition activities in the Islamic world. Al Qaeda's Audiences. Experts believe that Al Qaeda's diverse statements contain calculated variations in tone and content that address or appeal to various target audiences.
In his early statements, for example, Osama Bin Laden adopted a pseudo-nationalist tone in directly addressing the population of Saudi Arabia and. Palestine is under occupation and its constitution is man-made and pagan, and Islam has nothing to do with it. Rights cannot be restored from a regime when the ruler becomes renegade or refuses to follow religion except by force. In his statements addressed to the U.
Bin Laden's earlier statements also addressed the American public in several instances that he since has characterized as attempts to explain his motives and outline steps he and his followers believed the United States should have taken in order to avoid Al Qaeda attacks. Over time, the cornerstone of Al Qaeda's religious and political rhetoric has remained consistent: Muslims should view themselves as a single nation and unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis of obligatory defensive jihad.
Non- Islamic government is unacceptable, and Muslims should join Al Qaeda and other sympathetic groups and movements in opposing those seeking to establish secular democratic governments or maintain existing governments deemed to be insufficiently Islamic. Bin Laden has often coupled his "Islamic-unity" rhetoric with litanies of anti-Semitic statements, condemnations of Israel, and allegations of U.
Following September 11, , Bin Laden has appealed directly to national groups on the front lines of robust counter-terrorism operations, particularly the populations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories. Pragmatic Messianism. Although Bin Laden's ideological rhetoric has remained relatively consistent, he and other Al Qaeda leaders have placed varying levels of emphasis on specific strategic objectives and tactics in their statements over the years.
Bin Laden has outlined specific political demands that support an image of Al Qaeda as a pliable, pragmatic political actor. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda's operational record seems to indicate that its leaders' commitment to specific national causes and strategic objectives are rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader ideological agenda of confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world.
For example, Bin Laden's rhetorical treatment of the presence of U. Similarly, variations in the intensity and prominence of Bin Laden's anti-Israeli rhetoric has fueled suggestions that Al Qaeda's commitment to the Palestinian cause waxes and wanes depending on the network's need for support -- becoming more. Bin Laden has addressed these charges personally and argued that support for the Palestinians and all Muslims is and will remain essential to Al Qaeda's cause, which is the mobilization of the entire Muslim world in resistance to perceived U.
In his December statements, Bin Laden referred to the confrontation between the U. Tactically, Bin Laden consistently has advocated a program of retributional violence against the United States for alleged crimes against Muslims while demonstrating sophisticated perspectives on cooperation with non-Arab communities and non-Islamist groups.
Bin Laden's statements reveal sophisticated consideration of the economic and military vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies, particularly with regard to the role of Middle Eastern oil as "the basis of industry" in the global economy. Bin Laden's recent descriptions of Al Qaeda's "bleed-until-bankruptcy plan" and his discussion of the U. Recent statements urging attacks on oil pipelines and military supply lines could indicate a shift in Al Qaeda's strategic and tactical planning in favor of a more protracted attritional conflict characterized by disruptive attacks on economic and critical infrastructure.
In this regard, Bin Laden has identified "martyrdom operations," or suicide attacks, as "the most important operations" for disrupting the activities of the United States and its allies.
Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf for this is their fate. These are the most important operations. Al Qaeda and the Jihadist International. Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the strategic and tactical content of their statements to changing circumstances while retaining a messianic commitment to a broader ideological agenda.
Although Bin Laden's self-professed goal is to "move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation" 38 until it reaches a revolutionary "ignition point," 39 Bin Laden's statements and Al Qaeda's attacks largely have failed to effectively mobilize widespread Muslim support for their agenda thus far.
Since late , however, public opinion polling and media monitoring in the Middle East and broader Islamic world indicate that significant dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy has grown significantly within many Muslim societies.
In light of this trend, Bin Laden's recent shift toward more explicitly political and ideological rhetoric and his emphasis on the economic effectiveness of Al Qaeda's campaign to date seem to be harbingers of a renewed attempt by Al Qaeda's central leadership to broaden the movement's appeal, solicit greater material support, 40 and possibly inspire new and more systematically devastating attacks.
Some experts have argued however, that the increasingly uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of recent statements by Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi may alienate Muslims who oppose theocracy and who support secular, representative government. Experience suggests that Al Qaeda's leaders believe that regular attempts to characterize Al Qaeda's actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will increase tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program.
The identification of limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve broader grievances may have broader appeal than the group's underlying ideological agenda. Overall, Bin Laden's statements from the mids through the present indicate that he continues to see himself and his followers as the vanguard of an international Islamic movement primarily committed to ending U. His public statements, and those of his deputies, will likely continue to play an important, calculated role in reaching these goals.
Naval History and Heritage Command. Print Friendly. The Sextant. Social Media. Toggle left navigation Nav. Regardless of individual affluence, education, or nationality, the Afghan Jihad showed that Muslims could fight side by side and attain victory for all.
The individuals that filled the ranks of the mujahidin during this war came from all strata of society and proved that greater achievements could be attained through unity based on a common objective.
The battle concept was total war. Momentous events such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran in , the defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan, the collapse of communism, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War precipitated the creation of over one hundred contemporary Islamist movements in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans.
Al-Qaeda remains a capable organization, frequently packing surprises. Support for al-Qaeda is often spawned and sustained in regional conflict zones.
To reduce the appeal of this ideology, it is essential that the international community develop the capability and structures to end regional conflicts through political negotiation. Regional conflict zones—Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao Philippines , Maluku Indonesia , Poso Indonesia , Algeria, Afghanistan, and Iraq—are the biggest producers of human rights violations, internal displacement, refugee flows and terrorists.
International neglect of such conflicts, thinking that the warring parties will fight among each other and exhaust them themselves, has proven to be misguided. The key to strategically defeating the new international terrorism is to counter the extremist ideology that triggers, drives, and justifies it.
Because one of the methods by which terrorist ideologues recruit members is the subversion of madrasas, it is necessary to institute measures preventing the spread of extremism through the educational institutions.
Similarly, it is important for governments to work with media outlets—especially on television and the Internet—to present alternatives to the rhetoric and false ideas that inflame political extremism and make the al-Qaeda ideology so appealing. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, moderate Muslims must expose the deviant teachings of al-Qaeda and its associated groups, and assume responsibility for the future direction of Islam and their political communities.
Defeating al-Qaeda requires unconventional methods. Only by using military force in conjunction with a concerted effort to offer an ideological alternative to extremism can a wedge be driven between actual terrorists and potential terrorists and supporters.
It is essential that the counter-terrorism community understand that without marrying hard power with soft power, the al-Qaeda-led jihad movement will not be defeated. Alison Pargeter. Post-Qadhafi Libya has been defined by chaos, division and disintegration. With the once-strong center in tatters, the country has fragmented into an Michael Nwankpa. In northeastern Brenda Githing'u. In April , Azzam described his original concept of al-Qaeda thus: Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices.
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