Others e. This, too, seems both too thin and too severe as a criterion of perfection standing alone: too thin, because anyone suitably superficial and complacent might will the eternal return; too severe, because it seems to require that a post-Holocaust Goethe gladly will the repetition of the Holocaust.
Nietzsche, however, describes at great length and in many places e. Nietzsche holds that moral i. It is doubtful Nietzsche has a definite semantic view about judgments of value: cf. Hussain , esp. There is, on the skeptical view at issue here, a special problem about the objectivity of value. For an argument that Nietzsche is a global anti-realist about value in particular, see Leiter 84— The proponents of these views would hold the following:. Wilcox , Schacht and Katsafanas b , among many others, have defended a Realist reading, while Foot has defended a P-Non-Realist reading.
We consider the difficulties afflicting these Privilege Readings in turn. Realist readings assign a special place to power or will to power in explaining the objectivity of normative facts. On these views, Nietzsche holds, first, that only power really has value and, second, that power is an objective, natural property. From the fact, for example, that all life obeys the laws of fundamental physics, nothing follows about the appropriate standard of value.
This argument, though, is famously unsuccessful: from the fact that only happiness is desired, nothing at all follows about what ought to be desired. P , of course, is not valid, a point to which we will return.
Notice, now, that the same type of argument seems to capture what the N-Realist construal of Nietzsche has in mind. If P is valid, Value Nihilism false, and the descriptive doctrine of the will to power is true, then the normative conclusion about power, which Schacht is after, seems to follow. Note, of course, that the Millian Model argument as formulated so far would show only that power is what is non-morally valuable or good for an agent.
Of course, if the Millian Model argument for prudential value or non-moral goodness does not work, then that provides a very strong if defeasible reason for supposing that there is no further argument for the related account of non-prudential value as consisting in maximization of power. The first problem, of course, is that P is not valid.
While from the fact that x is heard, it follows that x is audible, it does not follow from that fact that x is desired that x is desirable in the sense necessary for the argument. Thus, while it follows that:. Yet in claiming that pleasure or power are valuable, Mill and the N-Realist Nietzsche are advancing a normative thesis.
The truth of this normative thesis, however, simply does not follow from the corresponding descriptive thesis. Many, of course, have thought this too facile a response. Now the IC puts a constraint on what things can, in fact, be desirable or valuable: namely, only those things that agents can, in fact, care about or desire.
This suggests that we might reformulate P as follows:. But what happens, then, if we grant the truth of Descriptive Hedonism: namely, that only pleasure is, in fact, desired. In that case, it would now follow that only pleasure is desirable ought to be desired assuming, again, that Value Nihilism is false.
That is, since something ought to be desired only if it can be desired internalism , then if only x can be desired, then only x ought to be desired assuming that Value Nihilism is false. Will this argument rescue the N-Realist Nietzsche? Two obstacles remain. The first, and perhaps less serious one, is that we must have some reason for accepting the IC — or, more modestly, some reason for thinking Nietzsche accepts it.
It is not clear, however, that there are adequate textual grounds for saying where Nietzsche stands on this question. Since the IC does, however, seem to be presupposed by the Nietzschean remarks from the Nachlass that support N-Realism — in the sense that such remarks do not constitute a good argument without the IC — let us grant that Nietzsche accepts the IC , and let us simply put aside the contentious issue of whether we ought to accept the IC as a general philosophical matter.
This presents two problems. First, in the works Nietzsche chose to publish, it seems clear that he did not, in fact, accept the doctrine in the strong form required for the N-Realist argument namely, that it is only power that persons ever aim for or desire. Second, it is simply not a plausible doctrine in its strong form. Since the N-Realist Nietzschean conclusion is that only power is valuable, power must be the only thing that is, in fact, desired assuming, again, that something is valuable, i.
Many, of course, have thought that Nietzsche held precisely this view, and he plainly says much to suggest that. The difficulty is that Nietzsche says other things which might suggest that the stronger remarks are misleading; for example:. But if all actions manifested this will , then this will could never be found lacking.
This passage is not atypical. Three other general textual considerations count against attributing the strong doctrine of the will to power to Nietzsche. Second, the view at issue presupposes an unusually strong doctrine of the will to power: a doctrine, to the effect, that all life actions, events reflects the will to power.
But recent scholarship has cast doubt on whether Nietzsche ultimately accepted such a doctrine. And you yourselves are also this will to power — and nothing besides!
Montinari has shown that Nietzsche had, in fact, discarded the passage by the spring of , pp. Finally, Maudemarie Clark has argued that Nietzsche could not have accepted the very strongest form of the doctrine of the will to power — namely, that all force , animate and inanimate, is will to power — given the putative argument he gives for it. Therefore, this section cannot constitute an argument for the strongest doctrine of the will to power that Nietzsche, himself, would actually accept!
Rather than embracing the strongest form of the doctrine, Clark argues that Nietzsche is, somewhat ironically, illustrating the very flaw of philosophers he warns against in the surrounding passages: namely, their tendency to propound theories of the essence of reality that are just projections of their own evaluative commitments Clark , pp.
Note, too, that Montinari claims that the one surviving relic of of The Will to Power in the published works is precisely the ironic Section 36 of Beyond Good and Evil , p. What, then, does Nietzsche believe about will to power? There are, to be sure, competing views in the secondary literature. Reginster treats will to power as a will to overcome resistances; Richardson treats will to power as the tendency of every drive to redirect every other drive towards its own ends.
As others have noted e. But a universal desire for either pleasure or power feelings is not especially plausible, even if both motives are important ones.
Indeed, as the preceding passages and considerations make clear, Nietzsche could not have believed that will to power was the exclusive explanation for all human behavior. To the extent he sometimes seems to embrace this stronger claim see the example, above , we must simply take Nietzsche to have overstated his case — something which his penchant for hyperbolic rhetoric and polemics often leads him to do — or to be engaged in the kind of ironic move described by Clark, above.
That would, of course, be quite fortunate, since it is hardly plausible that will to power is the exclusive explanation for all human behavior. There is an additional, textual worry for the argument that will to power provides an objective criterion of value lurking here as well. Nietzsche only makes the remarks that seem to suggest that power is an objective criterion in passages from the Nachlass , work that Nietzsche never published during his lifetime.
Thus, even if one thought that Nietzsche really held the strong descriptive doctrine of the will to power — the doctrine that all animate force perhaps all force is will to power — in his published works, it is still the case that he only uses this doctrine to argue for the normative conclusion in Nachlass material.
Since scholars have now raised important doubts about the canonical status of this Nachlass material Montinari , pp. For more recent debate about the relevance of the Nachlass material to understanding will to power, see Katsafanas b, pp. Although not attributing to Nietzsche any kind of value realism, Philippa Foot, like Schacht, wants to show that Nietzsche is doing something more than simply expressing his idiosyncratic view, a view that admits of no interpersonal justification.
Nehamas —; BGE But for a Calliclean like Nietzsche, it is part of the very appeal of morality that it does thwart the flourishing of higher men. On the Calliclean picture, there is a fundamental hostility between the high and low, the strong and the weak, one which will not be bridged by inviting the low to admire the high, or the weak, the strong. If Nietzsche is not a realist about value, then he must be an anti-realist: he must deny that there is any objective fact of the matter that would privilege his evaluative perspective over its target.
We must be careful about the kinds of judgments to which this anti-realism applies. Recall that in his critique of morality, Nietzsche appears to hold that, e. It may appear that regarding value judgments pertaining to welfare or prudential goodness — what is good or bad for particular sorts of persons — Nietzsche believes there is an objective fact of the matter, though one relative to type-facts about persons. Leiter for a revision of the view defended in Leiter Nietzsche certainly says much that sounds like he is denying the objectivity of values.
Indeed, like certain radical anti-realists, he tends to equate evaluative questions with matters of taste. Thus, since non-evaluative type-facts are the primary explanatory facts, and since explanatory power is the mark of objective facts, it appears that there cannot be any value facts.
To describe Nietzsche as a moral anti-realist is so far only to ascribe to him a metaphysical view: namely, that there are no objective facts about what is morally right and wrong. It is a somewhat vexed interpretive question whether we should also ascribe to Nietzsche a particular view about the semantics of moral judgment, a topic about which no philosopher prior to the 20 th century had a worked—out view see again Hussain For example, while it seems clear from the passages quoted above that Nietzsche has distinct views on the central metaphysical question about value, it seems equally apparent that there are inadequate textual resources for ascribing to him a satisfying answer to the semantic question.
Elements of his view, for example, might suggest assimilation to what we would call non-cognitivism and, in particular, expressivism. One cannot refute Christianity; one cannot refute a disease of the eye…. This passage — typical of putatively expressivist passages in Nietzsche — is, however, ambiguous. It would be astonishing if any 19 th -century philosopher were to have a clear answer to such a question Hussain seems to have come around to this view.
While Nietzsche was, to be sure, among the first to recognize the extent to which linguistic and grammatical practices generate metaphysical assumptions and problems, he simply did not view metaphysical questions themselves as best framed as issues about the semantics of a given region of discourse e. It is doubtful, then, that there are adequate grounds for assigning Nietzsche a view on such subtle matters as whether ethical language is primarily cognitive or non-cognitive, when it clearly evinces aspects of both descriptive and prescriptive discourse.
And if so, would such a view be compatible with anti-realism? But there is still no objective fact about whether MPS is non-prudentially disvaluable just because it has the effect of thwarting the flourishing of objectively higher types. Such a response cannot work for two reasons. Second, if it is an objective fact that Goethe is a higher type and, say, Hitler is a herd animal, then the following counterfactual would seem to be true:. He would have been better off because he would have been a higher type, instead of a lower type — and it is an objective fact that the high are really high, and the low are really low.
But this seemingly objective judgment — that Hitler would have been better off had he been more like Goethe — is a non-prudential value judgment; it is not a judgment about what is good for Hitler under the circumstances, but rather a judgment about what would make Hitler better off, but for his circumstances. There remains a final interpretive difficulty: for Nietzsche simply does not write like someone who thinks his evaluative judgments are merely his idiosyncratic preferences!
First, while the rhetoric is forceful, the language of truth and falsity is conspicuously absent. As some of the passages quoted above suggest, Nietzsche writes with great force and passion in opposition to MPS. But it is striking that he does not use the epistemic value terms — the language of truth and falsity, real and unreal — in this context. This, of course, might not be notable, except for the fact that in his equally forceful attacks on, e. Leiter , pp. One natural explanation for this difference in rhetoric — natural especially in light of the substantial evidence for his anti-realism — is precisely that in the moral case he does not think there is any fact of the matter.
But a skeptic about the efficacy of rational persuasion might very well opt for persuasion through other rhetorical devices. The Nietzsche who was almost completely ignored during the years before illness erased his intellect and deprived him of his sanity might have resorted to more and more strident and violent rhetoric in frustration over not being heard — and not because he was a realist.
Indeed, in the absence of explicit evidence of value realism, this seems the most plausible explanation for the vast majority of the passages with which we have been concerned in this section.
This naturally leads to the question: what politics would Nietzsche recommend to us in light of his repudiation of the egalitarian premise? The interpretive question, however, is whether scattered remarks and parenthetical outbursts add up to systematic views on questions of philosophical significance about politics.
Is Nietzsche even interested in political philosophy? Marx does not address most of them either. In particular, Nietzsche is said to endorse in A 56—57 the caste-based society associated with the Hindu Laws of Manu as his political ideal:.
This reading, however, does not withstand scrutiny, as Thomas Brobjer has argued. As Brobjer notes, the only other published discussion of the laws of Manu, in Twilight of the Idols , is highly critical, not laudatory pp. The passage from The Antichrist only seems laudatory when read out of context; as Brobjer remarks:. In other words, the rhetorical context of the passage is crucial, though it is typically ignored by commentators defending the Aristocratic Politics View.
Thus, although Manu and Christianity both depend on lies, at least the Manu lies, according to Nietzsche, are not put in the service of Christian ends, i. Similarly, Nietzsche goes out of his way to show that Christian views of female sexuality compare unfavorably with Manu views A The most balanced and careful defense of the Aristocratic Politics View, Detwiler , is not able to adduce much additional evidence.
For example, Detwiler ends up relying quite heavily on an essay the year-old Nietzsche never published 39—41, See in this regard the discussion of BGE in Huddleston n. The canon of political philosophers is composed of thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill who have philosophical views about political questions — the justification of state power, the liberty of the individual, political legitimacy, etc.
MPS is a threat to the flourishing of nascent Goethes, and it is this flourishing that interests Nietzsche above all. Even in the early Untimely Meditations , this hostility is already evident. So, for example, Nietzsche comments:. And who is that individual? Passages like these seem to support the Anti-Politics View. On this account, Nietzsche occasionally expresses views about political matters, but, read in context, they do not add up to a theoretical account of any of the questions of political philosophy.
He is more accurately read, in the end, as a kind of esoteric moralist , i. Indeed, Nietzsche is clearly describing his own work when he writes in an earlier book that,. It focuses its negative evaluation evil on violations of the interests or well-being of others—and consequently its positive evaluation good on altruistic concern for their welfare. Such a morality needs to have universalistic pretensions: if it is to promote and protect the welfare of all, its restrictions and injunctions must apply to everyone equally.
It is thereby especially amenable to ideas of basic human equality, starting from the thought that each person has an equal claim to moral consideration and respect. BGE The exact nature of this alleged revolt is a matter of ongoing scholarly controversy in recent literature, see Bittner ; Reginster ; Migotti ; Ridley ; May 41—54; Leiter —; Janaway 90—, —9; Owen 78—89; Wallace ; Anderson ; Poellner , but the broad outline is clear enough.
That emotion motivated the development of the new moral concept evil , purpose-designed for the moralistic condemnation of those enemies. Afterward, via negation of the concept of evil, the new concept of goodness emerges, rooted in altruistic concern of a sort that would inhibit evil actions. For Nietzsche, then, our morality amounts to a vindictive effort to poison the happiness of the fortunate GM III, 14 , instead of a high-minded, dispassionate, and strictly rational concern for others.
That said, Nietzsche offers two strands of evidence sufficient to give pause to an open-minded reader. Second, Nietzsche observes with confidence-shaking perspicacity how frequently indignant moralistic condemnation itself, whether arising in serious criminal or public matters or from more private personal interactions, can detach itself from any measured assessment of the wrong and devolve into a free-floating expression of vengeful resentment against some real or imagined perpetrator.
The First Treatise does little, however, to suggest why inhabitants of a noble morality might be at all moved by such condemnations, generating a question about how the moral revaluation could have succeeded. The Second Treatise, about guilt and bad conscience, offers some materials toward an answer to this puzzle. Nietzsche begins from the insight that guilt bears a close conceptual connection to the notion of debt.
The pure idea of moralized guilt answers this need by tying any wrong action inextricably and uniquely to a blamable agent. As we saw, the impulse to assign blame was central to the ressentiment that motivated the moral revaluation of values, according to the First Treatise.
Thus, insofar as people even nobles become susceptible to such moralized guilt, they might also become vulnerable to the revaluation, and Nietzsche offers some speculations about how and why this might happen GM II, 16— These criticisms have attracted an increasingly subtle secondary literature; see Reginster , as well as Williams a, b , Ridley , May 55—80 , Leiter —44 , Risse , , Janaway —42 , and Owen 91— In such cases, free-floating guilt can lose its social and moral point and develop into something hard to distinguish from a pathological desire for self-punishment.
Ascetic self-denial is a curious phenomenon indeed, on certain psychological assumptions, like descriptive psychological egoism or ordinary hedonism, it seems incomprehensible , but it is nevertheless strikingly widespread in the history of religious practice. One obvious route to such a value system, though far from the only one, is for the moralist to identify a set of drives and desires that people are bound to have—perhaps rooted in their human or animal nature—and to condemn those as evil; anti-sensualist forms of asceticism follow this path.
As Nietzsche emphasizes, purified guilt is naturally recruited as a tool for developing asceticism. Suffering is an inevitable part of the human condition, and the ascetic strategy is to interpret such suffering as punishment , thereby connecting it to the notion of guilt. Despite turning her own suffering against her, the move paradoxically offers certain advantages to the agent—not only does her suffering gain an explanation and moral justification, but her own activity can be validated by being enlisted on the side of punishment self-castigation :.
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; still more precisely, a perpetrator, still more specifically, a guilty perpetrator who is susceptible to suffering,.
Someone must be to blame for it; but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it— you alone are to blame for yourself! GM III, The principal bow stroke the ascetic priest allowed himself to cause the human soul to resound with wrenching and ecstatic music of every kind was executed—everyone knows this—by exploiting the feeling of guilt. Consider, for example, the stance of Schopenhauerian pessimism, according to which human life and the world have negative absolute value.
From that standpoint, the moralist can perfectly well allow that ascetic valuation is self-punishing and even destructive for the moral agent, but such conclusions are entirely consistent with—indeed, they seem like warranted responses to —the pessimistic evaluation.
That is, if life is an inherent evil and nothingness is a concrete improvement over existence, then diminishing or impairing life through asceticism yields a net enhancement of value. While asceticism imposes self-discipline on the sick practitioner, it simultaneously makes the person sicker, plunging her into intensified inner conflict GM III, 15, 20— While this section has focused on the Genealogy , it is worth noting that its three studies are offered only as examples of Nietzschean skepticism about conventional moral ideas.
Nietzsche tried out many different arguments against pity and compassion beginning already in Human, All-too-human and continuing to the end of his productive life—for discussion, see Reginster , Janaway forthcoming , and Nussbaum Nietzsche resists the hedonistic doctrine that pleasure and pain lie at the basis of all value claims, which would be the most natural way to defend such a presupposition.
From that point of view, the morality of compassion looks both presumptuous and misguided. It is misguided both because it runs the risk of robbing individuals of their opportunity to make something positive individually meaningful out of their suffering, and because the global devaluation of suffering as such dismisses in advance the potentially valuable aspects of our general condition as vulnerable and finite creatures GS ; compare Williams 82— For him, however, human beings remain valuing creatures in the last analysis.
It follows that no critique of traditional values could be practically effective without suggesting replacement values capable of meeting our needs as valuers see GS ; Anderson , esp. Nietzsche thought it was the job of philosophers to create such values BGE , so readers have long and rightly expected to find an account of value creation in his works.
It is common, if not altogether standard, to explain values by contrasting them against mere desires. Consider: If I become convinced that something I valued is not in fact valuable, that discovery is normally sufficient to provoke me to revise my value, suggesting that valuing must be responsive to the world; by contrast, subjective desires often persist even in the face of my judgment that their objects are not properly desirable, or are unattainable; see the entries on value theory and desire.
We [contemplatives] … are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations.
Only we have created the world that concerns man! Some scholars take the value creation passages as evidence that Nietzsche was an anti-realist about value, so that his confident evaluative judgments should be read as efforts at rhetorical persuasion rather than objective claims Leiter , or relatedly they suggest that Nietzsche could fruitfully be read as a skeptic, so that such passages should be evaluated primarily for their practical effect on readers Berry ; see also Leiter Others Hussain take Nietzsche to be advocating a fictionalist posture, according to which values are self-consciously invented contributions to a pretense through which we can satisfy our needs as valuing creatures, even though all evaluative claims are strictly speaking false.
First, while a few passages appear to offer a conception of value creation as some kind of legislative fiat e. Second, a great many of the passages esp. GS 78, , , , connect value creation to artistic creation, suggesting that Nietzsche took artistic creation and aesthetic value as an important paradigm or metaphor for his account of values and value creation more generally. While some Soll attack this entire idea as confused, other scholars have called on these passages as support for either fictionalist or subjective realist interpretations.
In addition to showing that not all value creation leads to results that Nietzsche would endorse, this observation leads to interesting questions—e. If so, what differentiates the two modes? Can we say anything about which is to be preferred? Nietzsche praises many different values, and in the main, he does not follow the stereotypically philosophical strategy of deriving his evaluative judgments from one or a few foundational principles.
A well-known passage appears near the opening of the late work, The Antichrist :. What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. That doctrine seems to include the proposal that creatures like us or more broadly: all life, or even all things period aim at the enhancement of their power—and then further, that this fact entails that enhanced power is good for us or for everything.
The same conception has been developed by Paul Katsafanas , who argues that, qua agents, we are ineluctably committed to valuing power because a Reginster-style will to power is a constitutive condition on acting at all. His account thereby contributes to the constitutivist strategy in ethics pioneered by Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman , On this view, what Nietzsche values is power understood as a tendency toward growth, strength, domination, or expansion Schacht —88; Hussain Leiter is surely right to raise worries about the Millian reconstruction.
Nietzsche apparently takes us to be committed to a wide diversity of first order aims, which raises prima facie doubts about the idea that for him all willing really takes power as its first-order aim as the Millian argument would require.
It is not clear that this view can avoid the objection rooted in the possibility of pessimism i. Given his engagement with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche should have been sensitive to the worry.
I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati : let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse.
Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: someday I wish to be only a Yes-sayer. GS Let our brilliance make them look dark. No, let us not become darker ourselves on their account, like all those who punish…. Let us look away. After that penultimate section, Nietzsche quotes the first section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra , which returns repeatedly to the same theme of affirmation see, e.
That critique is directed in large measure against aspects of morality that turn the agent against herself—or more broadly, against the side of Christianity that condemns earthly existence, demanding that we repent of it as the price of admission to a different, superior plane of being.
What is wrong with these views, according to Nietzsche, is that they negate our life, instead of affirming it. The affirmation of life can be framed as the rejection of nihilism, so understood. For Nietzsche, that involves a two-sided project: it should both undermine values by reference to which the world could not honestly be affirmed, while also articulating the values exemplified by life and the world that make them affirmable.
Readers interested in this issue about the compatibility of Nietzschean affirmation with Nietzschean critique should also consult Huddleston, forthcoming a, which reaches a more diffident conclusion than this entry. If we are to affirm our life and the world, however, we had better be honest about what they are really like. Endorsing things under some illusory Panglossian description is not affirmation, but self-delusion.
How much truth does a spirit endure , how much truth does it dare? More and more that became for me the real measure of value.
EH Pref. Some texts present truthfulness as a kind of personal commitment—one tied to particular projects and a way of life in which Nietzsche happens to have invested. For example, in GS 2 Nietzsche expresses bewilderment in the face of people who do not value honesty:.
I do not want to believe it although it is palpable: the great majority of people lacks an intellectual conscience. No, life has not disappointed me… ever since the day when the great liberator came to me: the idea that life could be an experiment for the seeker for knowledge….
Indeed, he assigns the highest cultural importance to the experiment testing whether such a life can be well lived:. A thinker is now that being in whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors now clash for their first fight, after the impulse for truth has proved to be also a life-preserving power.
Compared to the significance of this fight, everything else is a matter of indifference: the ultimate question about the conditions of life has been posed here, and we confront the first attempt to answer the question by experiment. To what extent can truth endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the experiment.
A second strand of texts emphasizes connections between truthfulness and courage , thereby valorizing honesty as the manifestation of an overall virtuous character marked by resoluteness, determination, and spiritual strength.
Such wishful thinking is not only cognitively corrupt, for Nietzsche, but a troubling manifestation of irresolution and cowardice. Finally, it is worth noting that even when Nietzsche raises doubts about this commitment to truthfulness, his very questions are clearly motivated by the central importance of that value.
But even in the face of such worries, Nietzsche does not simply give up on truthfulness. But if truthfulness is a core value for Nietzsche, he is nevertheless famous for insisting that we also need illusion to live well. From the beginning of his career to the end, he insisted on the irreplaceable value of art precisely because of its power to ensconce us in illusion. Art and artistry carry value for Nietzsche both as a straightforward first-order matter, and also as a source of higher-order lessons about how to create value more generally.
But Nietzsche is just as invested in the first-order evaluative point that what makes a life admirable includes its aesthetic features. One last point deserves special mention. Thereby, he thought that moral certainty could be achieved in the area of human conduct. Ultimately, his ethical framework required a belief in free will, immortality of the human soul, and a personal God as the moral judge of human behaviour of course, these are religious assumptions which the atheist Nietzsche would never have allowed in his own inquiry into values.
Furthermore, Kant made a crucial distinction between duty and inclination in order to separate the moral motive from all other motives. An act was only moral if you did it out of duty, regardless of your inclinations. Yet, it is not clear why a human being must always follow a pure moral intention, which would require one to sacrifice his or her own interests for the benefit of others or for the good of the whole. One may argue that Kant arrived at an empty intention in his compulsory appeal to the method of universalisation.
It seems to me, then, that Nietzsche was correct in his scepticism of traditional systematic philosophy.
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